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Abstract 
On September 10, 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics signed a joint memorandum 
calling for a change in the management of unobligated funds for acquisition programs. The 
memo was an attempt to stop the rush to obligate funds by the end of the current fiscal year 
in order to avoid reduced allocations in the next fiscal year. The memo identified six tenets for 
adoption throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). Included are tenets to reward 
acquisition program managers for returning unobligated funds and not to reduce future year 
program budgets just because current year obligation rates are lower than established 
benchmarks. The 2014 Annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System (OUSD[AT&L], 2014) indicated that the DoD was continuing the effort to change the 
acquisition culture from focusing on obligation rates. This research analyzes financial 
obligation rates for acquisition programs and acquisition program contract awards made in 
the last quarter of the fiscal year to determine if this policy memo has resulted in any change 
in behavior toward year-end spending. Research finds that the policy memo has not yet had 
an effect on behavior and that it has not been incorporated into DoD policy regulations. 
Background 
Unobligated balances are amounts of budget authority available to acquisition 
program managers (PMs) that have not yet been obligated on contracts. Each year, PMs 
must plan for obligating a high percentage of their available budget authority or risk losing 
the unobligated balance to a higher priority program. The process for repurposing budget 
authority from one program to another or from one appropriation account to another is 
termed reprogramming, and is done by the component comptroller and the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller). There are three primary means of reprogramming that could be 
used to repurpose unobligated balances: below threshold, congressional notification letter, 
and prior approval. 
Budget authority is provided to the Department of Defense (DoD) by three annual 
appropriation acts: the Defense Appropriation Act; the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs 
and Other Related Agencies Appropriation Act; and the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriation Act. Once these acts are signed by the President, the DoD can request 
apportionment of the budget authority from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
The OMB usually apportions the annual amount of budget authority for the procurement 
appropriation accounts and either annual or quarterly amounts for Research, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation accounts. However, the president may 
temporarily impound budget authority for programs with technical problems and may request 
rescission of budget authority for programs that have been canceled or changed 
significantly. In addition, the OMB may reduce the apportioned budget authority to pay for a 
program that the Congress authorized, but did not appropriate any budget authority for in 
one of the appropriations acts. For example, each year the Congress authorizes the Small 
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Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, but directs the DoD to fund the SBIR 
program with a general reduction in budget authority from all RDT&E-funded programs. 
In anticipation of the apportionment of budget authority, all PMs are to submit 
obligation and expenditure plans (also termed spending plans) to their component 
comptroller. These plans serve as a month-by-month forecast, through the entire fiscal year, 
of when budget authority will be obligated on contract and when the obligated amounts will 
be liquidated by expenditures made to pay defense contractors. It is important for the PM to 
prepare realistic spending plans. For new start programs, obligation of budget authority 
should not be planned for the first quarter of the fiscal year. Recent history has shown that 
the DoD operates in the first quarter of most fiscal years under stop-gap funding called a 
continuing resolution. Since the annual appropriation bills are still in work, budget authority 
for new starts has not yet been determined or appropriated. Therefore, obligations for new 
starts cannot be made while operating under a continuing resolution. PMs are also 
cautioned not to plan for the obligation of large amounts of budget authority in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year. This is because the appropriation acts usually restrict obligations 
in the last two months of the fiscal year to no more than 20% of the appropriated amount. 
The purpose of this constraint is to force planning and avoid rushing into contracts at the 
end of the fiscal year just to show that fund obligations have been made. 
In the March timeframe of each fiscal year, the component comptroller usually 




The purpose of this review is to identify programs that have deviated from their 
spending plans and have large unobligated balances of budget authority (i.e., low 
obligations) or large unliquidated obligations (i.e., low expenditures). About two years 
earlier, in the budget formulation process, the PM should have asked for RDT&E funds to 
cover all contractor-incurred costs in the fiscal year. This is in accordance with the 
incremental funding policy that applies to all RDT&E appropriation accounts (OUSD[AT&L], 
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2015). Similarly, the PMs should have requested budgets to fully fund complete, militarily-
useable end items in the fiscal year of contract award for those end items. This is in 
accordance with the full funding policy that applies to all procurement accounts, including 
Ship Building and Conversion, Navy, and to the Military Construction appropriation accounts 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2015). If budget authority is not being placed on contract in the year for 
which it was requested, the comptroller could decide to reprogram some or all of the 
unobligated amounts to a higher priority program. In Pentagon parlance, the under-obligated 
program could become a bill payer for a higher priority program.  
If the PM successfully defends the under-obligated program at the mid-year review, 
the pressure is on to get the majority of the budget authority obligated by September 30, the 
end of the fiscal year. If the funds are not obligated by the end of the first fiscal year of 
availability, then the comptroller has yet another opportunity to reduce the program’s future 
budget request during the Budgeting phase of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE) process. During this budget review, which occurs in the August to 
October timeframe, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and OMB analysts test 
the Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) submitted by the components to ensure that each 
program’s budget request is defendable before the Congress. As a result of this PPBE 
process budget review, the analysts will sometimes find that a program is forward financed. 
That is, compared to its needs, the program has too much current and carried-over budget 
authority. If this is the case, the analysts will recommend that the requested future budget be 
reduced accordingly. 
The tensions created by the mid-year and PPBE budget reviews can cause the PM 
to behave in different ways. First, as discussed above, the PM might decide to move quickly 
to get the budget authority on contract, regardless of how bad the business deal that is for 
the taxpayer. Obviously, this behavior is irresponsible, but logical in terms of retaining 
current budget authority and stabilizing future budget requests. Second, the PM might agree 
with the comptroller’s decision to reprogram unobligated funds to a higher priority program, 
provided that a promise is made to replace the budget authority removed with future funds, 
escalated as appropriate to account for future inflation and outlay rates. Finally, the PM 
might decide to fight any action by the comptroller to remove funds by sharply rebutting the 
action. This approach would require that a reclama be prepared, citing operational mission 
and supportability impacts to the user (warfighter) and business impacts that affect the 
execution of the program. If successful with the reclama, the PM has more time in which to 
negotiate a good deal before obligating the budget authority on contract. 
Having observed all of these behaviors over many years, in September 2012, the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Honorable Robert F. Hale, and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Honorable Frank 
Kendall III, signed a joint memorandum (copy in appendix) that outlined six new tenets for 
dealing with unobligated balances during budget reviews: 
1. Taxpayer funds should be obligated and ultimately expended only in the 
taxpayers' interest and if best value is received for the money in support of 
the Warfighter. 
2. While they can be useful indicators, obligation rates slower than established 
benchmarks should not be the determinative measuring stick for program 
execution and must not be regarded as a failure. 
3. Late obligation of funds should not be presumed to imply that the funds are 
not needed or that future budgets should be reduced unless there is other 
evidence to support that conclusion. 
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4. Providing savings to the organization, military service, or DOD component as 
early in the fiscal year as possible should be encouraged and rewarded, 
professionally and visibly. 
5. Savings will not be reallocated at any higher DOD level than necessary to 
fulfill shortfalls in priority requirements. 
6. Managers who release unobligated funds to higher priorities will not 
automatically be penalized in their next year's budget with a lower allocation 
and may be candidates for additional funding to offset prior year reductions. 
(OUSD[AT&L] & OUSD[C], 2012) 
The two under secretaries asked that acquisition and financial managers throughout the 
DoD follow these tenets when reviewing programs not meeting established obligation rates. 
However, as of this writing, the policy memorandum has not been incorporated into any DoD 
regulations (M. Engelking, personal communication, February 5, 2015).1  
Before incorporating these tenets into DoD regulations, data-driven research should 
be conducted to answer three important questions: 
1. What are the recent obligation rates, and how big are unobligated balances in 
the RDT&E and procurement accounts? 
2. What is happening to unobligated balances at the end of obligation 
availability? Are PMs rushing into poor contracts just to prevent funds from 
being taken away, or to prevent reductions to future budgets? 
3. What recent legislation has been introduced and/or enacted by the Congress 
on the subject of unobligated balances and meeting obligation benchmarks? 
The balance of this paper provides data-driven research that answers these 
questions and can be used to guide the implementation of policy guidance on the 
management of unobligated balances. 
Recent Trends in Obligation Rates and Unobligated Balances 
With the rollout of the president’s budget in February of each year, the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) presents a budget briefing for the news media and 
makes available financial summary tables. These tables contain historical and forecasted 
obligation rates for the RDT&E and procurement appropriation accounts. These rates, rolled 
to the DoD level and representing obligations at the end of the first year of obligation 
availability, were extracted and plotted in Figure 2. 
                                            
 
 
1 Email, dated February 5, 2015, regarding implementation of obligation rates tenets, follows: “Volume 
3, Chapter 8 [DoD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation] was revised and forwarded to the 
Office of Legal Counsel for coordination a few months ago. It was revised by an action officer who 
has since left OUSD(C). I am now responsible for the chapter. I reviewed my predecessor's files 
related to this chapter and did not locate a copy of the memorandum you provided. I also scanned the 
document to see if it addressed this issue. Unfortunately, the revised version does not address it. I 
will request that the chapter be returned to me for revision. It will be scheduled to be published by the 
end of the fiscal year. Thank you for bringing this to our attention. Maryla Engelking, CPA, CGFM, 
MBA, Senior Staff Accountant, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Financial 
Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR), 703-571-1657, maryla.e.engelking.civ@mail.mil.” 
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(OUSD[C], 2015b)  
From FY 2003 to FY 2012, RDT&E obligation rates held steady at 90%. This 
percentage is in accordance with historical DoD and Service/Component benchmarks for 
RDT&E obligations at the end of the first year of funds availability. However, overall RDT&E 
obligation rates dipped to 85% in FY 2013 and FY 2014. Perhaps this recent dip reflects 
implementation of the joint memo on obligation rate tenets, which was just discussed. 
However, if that were the case, one would expect to see a similar trend in the procurement 
accounts, which is not the case (see discussion that follows).  
From FY 2003 to FY 2007, procurement obligation rates hover between 80% and 
85%. This percentage is in accordance with historical DoD and Service/Component 
benchmarks for procurement obligations at the end of the first year of funds availability. 
However, procurement obligation rates begin to dip below 80% in FY 2008 and get as low 
as 67% and 68% in FY 2013 and FY 2014, respectively.  
The financial summary tables provided with the annual president’s budget rollout 
briefing also contain unobligated balances, brought forward from the previous fiscal year. 
These balances were extracted from the tables and plotted on bar graphs for RDT&E 
(Figure 3) and Procurement (Figure 4). In each figure, the bottom solid bar represents the 
budget authority appropriated in that particular fiscal year. The shaded tip of the bar 
represents the carryover of unobligated budget authority from the previous year. Together, 
the appropriated budget authority and the carryover funds can be considered a rough 
approximation of the total obligation authority available in any particular year. 
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(OUSD[C], 2015b)  
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In the DoD’s four RDT&E accounts, carryover as a percentage of total obligation 
authority has nearly doubled from 8.8% in FY 2003 to 15.9% in FY 2014. In the DoD’s 
procurement accounts, carryover as a percentage of total obligation authority has more than 
doubled from 15% in FY 2003 to 31.6% in FY 2014. Because the increases in unobligated 
balances began at least nine years earlier, the September 2012 joint memo on obligation 
rate tenets did not cause these carryover increases. Analysis of the Service/Component 
unobligated carryover indicates that 
from analyzing the trends in obligation rates and carryover data, the answer 
to the first important question becomes clear. Obligations rates in both the 
RDT&E and procurement accounts are falling, with procurement obligation 
rates falling at further than RDT&E obligation rates. Also, for both RDT&E 
and procurement, carryover balances have more than doubled as a 
percentage of total obligation authority. As will be seen later, lower obligation 
rates and higher carryover amounts make DOD appear to be forward 
financed and expose future budgets to higher risks of reduction during the 
congressional enactment process.  
Disposition of Unobligated Balances 
At the mid-year review, or whenever a higher priority need arises, reprogramming 
provides some flexibility for the DoD to repurpose budget authority. Prior approval 
reprogramming, requiring approval of the Congressional Defense Committees before 
implementation, is used when budget authority changes from one appropriation to another. 
However, below certain dollar and percentage thresholds, budget authority can be moved 
from one RDT&E program element to another or from one procurement line item to another. 
Such below-threshold reprogramming (BTR) can be accomplished by the 
Service/Component and DoD comptrollers and is reported to the Congress quarterly on DD 
1416 Program Reports. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) website contains 
only a few years of data on recent BTR actions. This data is plotted, by the four DoD RDT&E 









Figures 5 and 6 reveal that, at least for two years (FY 2011 and FY 2012), the 
number of BTR actions and the budget authority repurposed through BTR actions declined 
in all four of the RDT&E appropriation accounts. One might conclude from this data that the 
policy memo on obligation rate tenets has had an effect. Fewer BTR actions might mean 
that fewer acquisition programs are being tapped as bill payers for higher priorities. 
However, more research is needed into the reasons for the BTR actions and the reason for 
the decline in the number of BTR actions/amounts. Only the 2010 DD 1416 Quarterly 
Reports of Programs identify reason codes associated with the BTR actions. After 2010, the 
codes and hyperlinks to any amplifying information are missing. Help from the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is needed to provide this missing information. 
Contract awards made late in the fiscal year, particularly in the fourth quarter, may 
also be an indicator of the effect of the policy memo on obligation rate tenets. PMs and 
business financial managers (BFMs) are taught not to plan for obligations of funds in the 
fourth quarter of any fiscal year. One reason for this is because the appropriation acts 
usually restrict obligations in the last two months of the fiscal year to no more than 20% of 
the appropriated amount. Another reason for not planning fourth quarter contract awards is 
that program schedules and contract awards often slip. If program schedule slippage does 
occur, it is easy for the comptroller to recommend that contract awards scheduled for the 
fourth quarter be rescheduled into the next fiscal year. 
The Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) has a 
database of 421 large active contracts from Major Defense Acquisition Program and Major 
Automated Information Systems. The award dates of these contracts are plotted in the bar 
chart in Figure 7. 
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Although PMs and BFMs are taught to avoid scheduling contract awards in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year, the data in Figure 5 shows that a number of contract awards are, 
in fact, taking place in the fourth quarter. If unobligated funds can be carried over, because 
obligation benchmarks have been relaxed, perhaps the PMs are attempting to commit those 
funds before the end of the fiscal year when the funds’ period of obligation availability ends. 
Unfortunately, the data provided in the DAMIR data used in Figure 5 does not reveal or 
imply any causal relationship between the fourth quarter contract awards and the policy 
memo on obligation rate tenets. More research into the reason for fourth quarter contract 
awards is needed. 
Recent Legislation on Unobligated Balances and Benchmarks 
The annual Defense Appropriations Act consistently includes this language: “No 
more than 20 percent of the appropriations in this Act which are limited for obligation during 
the current fiscal year shall be obligated during the last 2 months of the fiscal year” 
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015). This language is supposed to preclude a 
rush to award contracts, just to lower unobligated balances at the end of the fiscal year.  
Over the past several years, the Congress has marked down the DoD portion of the 
president’s budget request when large unobligated balances exist. For example, in the DoD 
Appropriations Act for 2015, the Congress cut $1.76 billion out of the request due to 
unobligated balances left over from earlier budget years (Congressional Research Service, 
2015). Enacting the FY 2012 Defense Appropriations Act, the Congress cut $2.66 billion 
from the president’s budget request with the rationale that that unobligated balances could 
be used in lieu of new budget authority. (Congressional Research Service, 2012). Of course, 
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the problem is that new budget authority has longer periods of availability than old 
unobligated funds. What might appear to be a rational reduction in new budget authority is 
really placing a more onerous task on financial managers and contracting officers who must 
now work more quickly to get the old funds obligated on contracts.  
Finally, in the case of recent sequestration cuts, there is a somewhat ironic 
advantage to having large unobligated balances. For example, in FY 2013, sequestration 
cuts to DoD investment accounts resulted in an average 11.2% reduction across old 
unobligated funds. However, the more current FY 2013 budget authority, which has a longer 
period of obligation availability than old funds, was somewhat preserved, suffering an 
average sequestration cut of only 5.2% (Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
Conclusion 
Given the data-driven research just provided, the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
should exercise caution in implementing their joint policy memorandum that outlined 
obligation rate tenets. First, recent trends in obligation rates have shown that by the end of 
the first year of obligation availability, obligation rates for both the RDT&E and the 
procurement appropriations have dropped below historical norms. Second, this drop in 
obligation rates has resulted in the carryover of a greater percentage of funds each budget 
year. Motivated by austere times, the Congress continues to cut the DoD portion of the 
president’s budget request by amounts nearly equal to the carryover amounts. 
Contract awards in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year may indicate that there is still 
a rush to place funds on contract before the end of obligation availability. While some of 
these rushed contract awards may represent a good business deal, some of the fourth 
quarter awards probably waste taxpayer dollars. However, more research is needed into the 
reasons for fourth quarter contract awards. The number of reprogramming actions and 
associated amounts of repurposed budget authority may also be an indicator of behavior 
toward unobligated balances. However, reason codes are missing from recent BTR data, so 
it was not possible in this research effort to link any change in BTR actions or BTR amounts 
to the policy memo on obligation rate tenets. 
Perhaps the Services/Components are following the joint policy memorandum on 
obligation rate tenets even though the policy has not been incorporated into any DoD 
regulation. This may be a causal reason for lower obligation rates and increasing carryover 
amounts in the RDT&E appropriation accounts. But, why did obligation rates dip five years 
earlier in the procurement appropriation accounts? Once again, more research is needed. 
Whether or not there is any linkage between the data revealed by this research and 
the joint policy on obligation rate tenets, the Congressional Defense Committees need to be 
informed of the policy and asked not to decrement RDT&E and procurement accounts 
without first assessing why large unobligated balances exist for some acquisition programs. 
Of course the DoD will have to provide more detail on carryover amounts, perhaps as part of 
budget justification materials, to convince the Congressional Defense Committees that the 
carryover of funds is legitimate and necessary for program success. 
It would be prudent for the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to get the Congress to 
agree with the policy memo on obligation rate tenets before incorporating those tenets into 
DoD regulations. And, it appears that such a dialog has now begun. In response to a 
request from the U.S. Senate for ideas on the subject of Defense Acquisition Reform, the 
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Honorable Frank Kendall III, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, wrote 
For 4 years I have worked to train and encourage our acquisition workforce to 
take time to get good business deals for the Taxpayer by conducting 
appropriate upfront analysis, and by doing the systems engineering and 
planning necessary for successful programs. At the same time our program 
managers live in a world in which they are punished for not obligating the 
funds they control on set schedules. We should have realistic plans to 
execute our budgets, but when a manager has sound reasons to delay 
obligation, that behavior should not be punished. I have worked with the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to provide a more balanced 
approach to how we handle obligation reviews within the Department, and we 
would like to work closely with Congress in striking a similar balance on this 
matter. (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2014, p. 115) 
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